There are those, especially on the Left, who see modern America, as running an Empire. Basically, they are confusing America’s role after World War II as a major and only player after the fall of Soviet Communism on the world diplomatic stage. Of course, some even mention the Manifest Destiny as being a phase of Empire but expansion is not empire. Empire conquers and rules diverse peoples and uses conquest as a means to fund the Empire and is under control of a powerful King or Czar or leader in the strict sense. Soviet Russia denuded Eastern Europe after WWII; U.S. had the Marshall Plan to revitalize Western Europe: one acting as Empire the other beneficently. The fact is Democracies are particularly bad at running empires.
The primary reason the world isn't predominantly Fascist or Communist is due to fact America, representative democracy, is the most powerful country in the world. It destroyed its enemies in unconditional war and then re-built them as democratic governments. Hitler might have been overthrown by his military as was Mussolini if not for the unconditional surrender doctrine. Roosevelt impulsively arrived at the doctrine at the Casablanca Conference in 1942.The American Democracy was able to summon resources of the society nothing like monarchies could and once summoned they won't countenance half messages. Total unconditional surrender it was and the destruction that accompanied it.
American’s viewed its critical role in the First World War naively; it wasn't to preserve the British Empire's standing in the world, it was told, but to make the world safe for democracy which it did the former but not the latter. The results were just the opposite: with the rise of Fascism in Italy, Nazism in Germany and Communism in Russia. At the outbreak of World War II in the West, in six weeks French Republic fell like a house of cards, barely fighting for itself in the face of the Panzers' Blitzkrieg. Hitler viewed the vitality of democracies in this light and the light of the weak Weimar Republic so unsure of itself, that the Nazi’s took over. And so he viewed the USA with its 20th largest army in the world. Much to his chagrin the American Republic still confident and self assured mustered a vast military machine unlike any in history. The arsenal of Democracy leveled his Dritte Reich.
Now America views itself as a hotbed of racism and bigotry with a history of land grabbing/theft from the native peoples. After the Vietnam War it began to question itself like a drunk after a binge. And it began to question itself and its role as leader in the World. These are questions democracies are very hesitant and frankly very bad at answering.
Let’s face it, Democracies are incapable of running an empire. And left wing attestations or rather illusions that America is running one are wrong headed and silly. Each nation we subdue or influence, we insist our democratic republic view over it. Much like Iran with the Shah, pro American and Western, we shrank from support deeming it oppressive and non democratic. The alternative is Radical fundamentalist revolution just as authoritarian and instead of a pro-American Western leaning regime, virulently opposed to the Great Satan America, and we are left with an enemy not a friend. And Iraq, highly authoritarian and repressive, nonetheless the most modern state in that part of the region, where Christians were free from attack and women were granted rights not given under Islamic Sharia, we destroy militarily and now we are left to clean up at the tune of $500 billion. Diplomacy anyone?
But Democracies only react to crisis. Failure to see the rise of Hitler and Soviet Communism before WWII is one glaring example. Soviet communism much to Hitler’s surprise was able to wage war better than Germany; it could summon even more society's resources to carry on war than Nazi's could. All economic resources were husbanded. When Nazi Germany overran Eastern Russia an area the size of Western Europe, Soviet Russia responded by moving 1500 businesses East beyond the Urals and continued making armaments, guns, tanks, planes. Military justice was draconian; there’s a saying that it took a very brave man to be a coward in the Soviet Army, some thousands were shot in the battle of Stalingrad alone. During the battle, to cross the Volga to get over to Stalingrad was almost suicide in the face of German attacks but to remain was certain summary execution by the Soviet Army. Anyway where was I?
The most extensive empire in history was the British Empire of which U.S. freed itself with much assistance from the French Royalty. The sun was said never set on it at its greatest extent. These folks knew how to run one. Even after WWI they acquired dominion in the Middle East. In fact they carved up the Ottoman Empire that collapsed after WWI, creating the countries like Iraq and Jordan out of its remains, making the world safe for the British Empire. The British had few qualms about knocking heads. The suppressing of the Sepoy Rebellion of 1857 in India saw summary execution of captured soldiers and sympathetic civilians by the thousands. This meant the official beginning of the Indian Empire, prior to which the British ruled through the East Indian Company, since the British Government was responsible for putting down Indian sub-continents revolt with its numerous Princely states, client states, etc.
British used disaffected minorities as their enforcers, such as the Singh’s in India, the Tutsi’s in East Africa, the Sunni’s in Iraq. Case in point the British ran India, a country of 300 millions, with some 300 hundred thousands. Compare this with American in Iraq with it's 150 Thousands to attempt to subdue a country of 17 millions in the 21st Century. To run an empire it’s best to play smart; U.S. wants to waylay a country as it did in the Iraq wars but this is extremely costly: very stupid. An empire would have spent something less than 500 billion to reduce Iraq. For that much Saddam Hussein could have been paid to leave, or have someone see that Saddam, the madman, come upon an accident. But that wouldn’t have been cricket, but you don’t build empires by playing cricket. Or they might have used Israel to do their bidding but of course that’s not really possible either since the several billions dollar subsidy to Israel each year can’t be done as something contingent but guaranteed to keep a voting block happy. Basically, America has no idea how to run one, as it shouldn’t I realize, but not obvious to the left, Michael Moore included, who see America as this sinister monster.
America is playing world policeman because they found out that planes and aircraft carriers, missiles and warheads cross oceans. As a citizen I would be delighted to have this chore be taken over by someone else. But who? China? Russia? Europe no longer has the will. The next time Saudi Arabia gets invaded (40-50% of known oil reserves) i.e. when Iraq moved into Kuwait they were spitting distance from Saudi Arabia and several other Oil producing countries. America sits on its hands and watches oil be captive to a madman, right? Yes, and there are those who would say we go back to the wind mill and the bicycle. Yes, but the transition would be very, very difficult for a populace used to comfort and ease. Politically it ain’t gonna happen. Political heads would roll. You see it would be crisis time. War America does very well, but empires aren’t run on crisis but decision making of the supreme ruler/emperor. We are talking about running an empire not just winning wars; for empire countries have to be pacified not necessarily transformed into miniature America’s. America’s representative democracy can’t react. Neither could France in the face of Nazi Germany in 1934 when Germany occupied the de-militarized Alsace region fought over since the 30 Years War ending in 1648, when the French took it. Confronted at the time, Hitler's aggression, using cardboard tanks, would have been seen as the bluff it was and his regime would have collapsed.
Saturday, August 9, 2008
Monday, July 21, 2008
Visit to Gettysburg
I visited Gettysburg Battlefield for 3 days last week. What a Beautifully preserved battlefield! It has the look and feel of a beautiful park. The carnage is forgotten, which would really be too much to experience. But we honor the sacrifice in peace and tranquility that this terrible battle gives us. The statuary is magnificent as well. Not to mention the intricate bas relief on numerous monuments. This inspires in contrast to the cloistered art sheltered in museums away from public life that ofttimes wishes to confuse us and obscure not edify.
One especially interesting site is the Eternal Light Peace memorial on Oak Hill. It's a massive block of granite with a simple bas relief of a pair of female figures representing war and peace with an eagle at their feet on its face of this huge block. These figures enthrall in their simplicity and clarity. The memorial provides a beautiful vista as well. Its a great place to visit even if you don't understand anything about the battle.
Question is what was Lee doing in Pennsylvania? Was it a mistake to invade? The day the battle ended in defeat the fortress at Vicksburg, Mississippi surrendered to Grant who would become Lee's nemesis once Grant came East. Could Vicksburg have been saved? There were regiments from all over the Southern Confederacy defending Lee's Virginia in this invasion. The fall of Vicksburg severed the Confederacy and opened the Mississippi. The Midwest, in minor revolt in some segments (There were wide spread Democratic party victories in the Fall Elections of 1862. The opposition was very adverse to the reason the war began to be being carried on: abolition of Slavery not formerly to save the Union. ) in part due to the blockage of the Old Muddy, could once again gain access to the markets in New Orleans. Could a transfer of those troops have saved Vicksburg? Well, the Confederate victory at Chickamagua, GA. in September of 1863 just 2 months later was due in large part to a transfer of Longstreet's corps to General Bragg.
Lee had many reasons for his invasion: to relieve Northern Virginia of another campaign, demonstrate to the North the continued sacrifice needed to defeat the South and persuade peace minded elements to opposition to the War, and most importantly an attempt to destroy the Union army in open battle "in detail" and pounce on the Union army unavoidably stretched out as it attempted to follow and locate the Confederates and protect Washington at the same time. This strategy would permit the Confederates to battle and defeat a smaller portion of an Army that outnumbered Lee's.
The invasion had many problems. Text book military tactics expect that the army on the offense outnumber the defenders ideally by two or three to one. Lee's army was always smaller than the Union. It took troops from other regions of the Southern Confederacy and thus weakened them. It was much easier to defend in this modern war than to attack. Waiting for the Union army to attack and parry their thrusts, would be the safer and more surefire way to fight the North. Nonetheless, Lee was had several victories to his credit and so his strategy was followed.
As the campaign proceeded Lee found that the cavalry didn't provide information about the Union army's whereabouts. The primary reason for cavalry at this time was to shelter the army as it traveled in order to place a fog of ignorance around it and at the same time acquire information about the enemy and its size and position. Stuart, the famed leader of the Confederate cavalry, numbering some thousands mind you, failed utterly in this task on this campaign. Given contradictory orders by Lee, nonetheless Stuart should have realized his main purpose to gather information not simply wreck havoc on the supply lines. Instead he took a weeks tour if you will around the Union army and even "threatened" Washington, D.C. but in fact completely lost touch with the Confederate Army. As a result Lee's army unknowingly bumped into the Union at Gettysburg. The Union army with forced marches was able to gather itself at Gettysburg and sustain the blows from the Confederates. All in all the invasion was one big gamble that failed and yes, maybe it was worth the risk considering the long odds of defeating the industrial North so evidently overpowering in comparison to the agrarian South. But still a failure.
To top it off there is the folly of the attack against fortified positions at Cemetery Ridge on the third day. Known as Pickett's charge, this attack was a foolhardy and tragic undertaking. On the third day of battle Lee sends some 12,000 troops over a mile of open ground after an ineffectual artillery bombardment against the entrenched Union central sector on Cemetery Ridge. This was against the advice of his Senior Lieutenant, Longstreet. Only some 5,500 come back with thousands killed, wounded, captured. Mind you Union General Burnside failed at this tactic at Fredericksburg some six months before but didn't have enough sense to give up until 16 tries against Confederate positions. This charge was a gamble to break the Union in the center. Now at the same time Stuart, was to have threatened the Union rear, fought and was repulsed by the Union cavalry. His defeat was not critical. His role would have been to harass the broken Union elements after Lee breaks the center.
The three day battle was lost on the first day when two Confederate Corps had driven the 1st and the Union retreating through Gettysburg. General Ewell, Second Corps, allowed them to regroup their forces on Cemetery Hill. This is where General Lee missed Stonewall Jackson decisive aggressiveness, who was killed at Chancellorsville some two months before. Lee's orders to Ewell, leaving his Lieutenant leeway (no pun intended), were to attack the Union forces on Cemetery Hill Southeast of Gettysburg "if practical". Ewell, once again suffering from lack of information due to an absent Cavalry, didn't know if other elements of the Union army lurked close by. These in fact were close in Slocum's 12th corp only six miles south. He, being Regular Army, chose to ignore pleas from the elements under attack (he could hear the sounds of battle), preferring to wait on orders from his superior, General Meade, Commander of the Army of the Potomac, in Taneytown 12 miles away from Gettysburg.
Longstreet, who opposed the invasion in the first place, wanted to restrain from attacking the Union army in prepared positions. His strategy was to try to slide between the Union army Washington. Maybe Lee understood he'd lost his chance to attack the enemy in detail and so his only chance of gaining something out of this campaign was to risk a roll of the dice by trying to break the Union Army at some point. Note the Union army had the benefit of interior lines and could and did move troops back and forth to support areas under attack.
Some days later in retreat from Gettysburg, the Army of Virginia, greatly reduced in size, was held up for days at Williamsport, MD waiting for the Potomac river to recede after heavy rains; their pontoon bridge had been destroyed by Union elements. They of course were retreating back to Virginia. General Meade dallied, fearful, it would seem of attacking entrenched positions, mind you, and the Confederates were allowed to escape back to safety. Here is Lee placing his Army at grave risk but Lee knew Meade and so it wasn't the risk it appears to us, I'm guessing. And my point about defensive war reinforced, while Lee's army was a fraction of the Federal, the risk of attacking entrenched positions seemed too great.
Lee took a gamble he could bring the Union army to a Cannae, a complete defeat. Part of his strategic aim was to enbolden the Peace party in the North with a dramatic defeat of the Union army. Invasion of the North did just the opposite; the Peace party was discredited with the prospect of invasion and further discounted by the defeat and repulse of the the Army of the Potomac. Instead the news the day after the Battle on July 4 was the fall of Vicksburg on the Mississippi; General Grant had forced the surrender of the fortress and its 30,000 troops .
As an offensive weapon the Army of the Potomac was blunted. It would not carry an offensive champaign again. Approximately 30,000 thousand troops were lost to this Southern army. Thousands of the wounded who might have been returned to this Army were left on the battlefield and captured. The officer core was decimated from Regimental officers up to Corp.
Of course a great deal of speculation could be made about what might have happened without the invasion of Pennsylvania. The South was pinned against Richmond the year before by McClellan. Only by gymnastics by Lee was the South able to drive the Federals from Richmond. Taking the risk of placing most of his army against McClellan's right wing and leaving his right flank greatly out numbered was he able to drive McClellan away from the capital, Richmond. McClellan all the while believing he was up against a superior foe and being overly cautious retreated back down the James Peninsula whence he came. There's a good chance that a more determined foe could have captured Richmond; yet, it took Grant nearly a year to do it in 1864-65. And others have questioned the idea of Richmond being made the Capital when Birmingham or some other City in the deep South might have been more defensible. I mention this since loss of Richmond might not have held such importance, leaving troops free to defend elsewhere. Without a major victory before the 1864 elections with the Fall of Atlanta, who knows how much longer the North would have stuck with it. Lincoln could have been voted out and McClellan, his opponent and former General of the Potomac, might have been more amenable to negotiation.
One especially interesting site is the Eternal Light Peace memorial on Oak Hill. It's a massive block of granite with a simple bas relief of a pair of female figures representing war and peace with an eagle at their feet on its face of this huge block. These figures enthrall in their simplicity and clarity. The memorial provides a beautiful vista as well. Its a great place to visit even if you don't understand anything about the battle.
Question is what was Lee doing in Pennsylvania? Was it a mistake to invade? The day the battle ended in defeat the fortress at Vicksburg, Mississippi surrendered to Grant who would become Lee's nemesis once Grant came East. Could Vicksburg have been saved? There were regiments from all over the Southern Confederacy defending Lee's Virginia in this invasion. The fall of Vicksburg severed the Confederacy and opened the Mississippi. The Midwest, in minor revolt in some segments (There were wide spread Democratic party victories in the Fall Elections of 1862. The opposition was very adverse to the reason the war began to be being carried on: abolition of Slavery not formerly to save the Union. ) in part due to the blockage of the Old Muddy, could once again gain access to the markets in New Orleans. Could a transfer of those troops have saved Vicksburg? Well, the Confederate victory at Chickamagua, GA. in September of 1863 just 2 months later was due in large part to a transfer of Longstreet's corps to General Bragg.
Lee had many reasons for his invasion: to relieve Northern Virginia of another campaign, demonstrate to the North the continued sacrifice needed to defeat the South and persuade peace minded elements to opposition to the War, and most importantly an attempt to destroy the Union army in open battle "in detail" and pounce on the Union army unavoidably stretched out as it attempted to follow and locate the Confederates and protect Washington at the same time. This strategy would permit the Confederates to battle and defeat a smaller portion of an Army that outnumbered Lee's.
The invasion had many problems. Text book military tactics expect that the army on the offense outnumber the defenders ideally by two or three to one. Lee's army was always smaller than the Union. It took troops from other regions of the Southern Confederacy and thus weakened them. It was much easier to defend in this modern war than to attack. Waiting for the Union army to attack and parry their thrusts, would be the safer and more surefire way to fight the North. Nonetheless, Lee was had several victories to his credit and so his strategy was followed.
As the campaign proceeded Lee found that the cavalry didn't provide information about the Union army's whereabouts. The primary reason for cavalry at this time was to shelter the army as it traveled in order to place a fog of ignorance around it and at the same time acquire information about the enemy and its size and position. Stuart, the famed leader of the Confederate cavalry, numbering some thousands mind you, failed utterly in this task on this campaign. Given contradictory orders by Lee, nonetheless Stuart should have realized his main purpose to gather information not simply wreck havoc on the supply lines. Instead he took a weeks tour if you will around the Union army and even "threatened" Washington, D.C. but in fact completely lost touch with the Confederate Army. As a result Lee's army unknowingly bumped into the Union at Gettysburg. The Union army with forced marches was able to gather itself at Gettysburg and sustain the blows from the Confederates. All in all the invasion was one big gamble that failed and yes, maybe it was worth the risk considering the long odds of defeating the industrial North so evidently overpowering in comparison to the agrarian South. But still a failure.
To top it off there is the folly of the attack against fortified positions at Cemetery Ridge on the third day. Known as Pickett's charge, this attack was a foolhardy and tragic undertaking. On the third day of battle Lee sends some 12,000 troops over a mile of open ground after an ineffectual artillery bombardment against the entrenched Union central sector on Cemetery Ridge. This was against the advice of his Senior Lieutenant, Longstreet. Only some 5,500 come back with thousands killed, wounded, captured. Mind you Union General Burnside failed at this tactic at Fredericksburg some six months before but didn't have enough sense to give up until 16 tries against Confederate positions. This charge was a gamble to break the Union in the center. Now at the same time Stuart, was to have threatened the Union rear, fought and was repulsed by the Union cavalry. His defeat was not critical. His role would have been to harass the broken Union elements after Lee breaks the center.
The three day battle was lost on the first day when two Confederate Corps had driven the 1st and the Union retreating through Gettysburg. General Ewell, Second Corps, allowed them to regroup their forces on Cemetery Hill. This is where General Lee missed Stonewall Jackson decisive aggressiveness, who was killed at Chancellorsville some two months before. Lee's orders to Ewell, leaving his Lieutenant leeway (no pun intended), were to attack the Union forces on Cemetery Hill Southeast of Gettysburg "if practical". Ewell, once again suffering from lack of information due to an absent Cavalry, didn't know if other elements of the Union army lurked close by. These in fact were close in Slocum's 12th corp only six miles south. He, being Regular Army, chose to ignore pleas from the elements under attack (he could hear the sounds of battle), preferring to wait on orders from his superior, General Meade, Commander of the Army of the Potomac, in Taneytown 12 miles away from Gettysburg.
Longstreet, who opposed the invasion in the first place, wanted to restrain from attacking the Union army in prepared positions. His strategy was to try to slide between the Union army Washington. Maybe Lee understood he'd lost his chance to attack the enemy in detail and so his only chance of gaining something out of this campaign was to risk a roll of the dice by trying to break the Union Army at some point. Note the Union army had the benefit of interior lines and could and did move troops back and forth to support areas under attack.
Some days later in retreat from Gettysburg, the Army of Virginia, greatly reduced in size, was held up for days at Williamsport, MD waiting for the Potomac river to recede after heavy rains; their pontoon bridge had been destroyed by Union elements. They of course were retreating back to Virginia. General Meade dallied, fearful, it would seem of attacking entrenched positions, mind you, and the Confederates were allowed to escape back to safety. Here is Lee placing his Army at grave risk but Lee knew Meade and so it wasn't the risk it appears to us, I'm guessing. And my point about defensive war reinforced, while Lee's army was a fraction of the Federal, the risk of attacking entrenched positions seemed too great.
Lee took a gamble he could bring the Union army to a Cannae, a complete defeat. Part of his strategic aim was to enbolden the Peace party in the North with a dramatic defeat of the Union army. Invasion of the North did just the opposite; the Peace party was discredited with the prospect of invasion and further discounted by the defeat and repulse of the the Army of the Potomac. Instead the news the day after the Battle on July 4 was the fall of Vicksburg on the Mississippi; General Grant had forced the surrender of the fortress and its 30,000 troops .
As an offensive weapon the Army of the Potomac was blunted. It would not carry an offensive champaign again. Approximately 30,000 thousand troops were lost to this Southern army. Thousands of the wounded who might have been returned to this Army were left on the battlefield and captured. The officer core was decimated from Regimental officers up to Corp.
Of course a great deal of speculation could be made about what might have happened without the invasion of Pennsylvania. The South was pinned against Richmond the year before by McClellan. Only by gymnastics by Lee was the South able to drive the Federals from Richmond. Taking the risk of placing most of his army against McClellan's right wing and leaving his right flank greatly out numbered was he able to drive McClellan away from the capital, Richmond. McClellan all the while believing he was up against a superior foe and being overly cautious retreated back down the James Peninsula whence he came. There's a good chance that a more determined foe could have captured Richmond; yet, it took Grant nearly a year to do it in 1864-65. And others have questioned the idea of Richmond being made the Capital when Birmingham or some other City in the deep South might have been more defensible. I mention this since loss of Richmond might not have held such importance, leaving troops free to defend elsewhere. Without a major victory before the 1864 elections with the Fall of Atlanta, who knows how much longer the North would have stuck with it. Lincoln could have been voted out and McClellan, his opponent and former General of the Potomac, might have been more amenable to negotiation.
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